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It is dangerous to press upon man the duty of getting
beyond earthly love when his real difficulty lies in getting so
far.1

T

he Irish-born author, Christian apologist and literary scholar, C. S. Lew-

is (1898–1963), spent most of his life in Oxford and (later) Cambridge,
and left the British Isles only twice during his entire life. Except for the five
years he spent in Italy, Augustine Aurelius (354–430), the Numidian-born
Bishop of Hippo and Church Father, never ventured out of North Africa.
The relative immobility and deep-rootedness of these two men helped both
to form meaningful friendships and embrace a life of study. Lewis paid Augustine the compliment of including in his literary diet a hefty amount of
Augustine’s work. In his theological and ethical thought, especially in his understanding of love, Lewis is greatly indebted to the Augustinian tradition.
In all of Lewis’ work, ranging from his scholarly monographs to books for
children, “Augustinian themes, in particular, abound.”2
Lewis did nothing to conceal his admiration of—and theological pedigree
to—Augustine: as he wrote, Augustine “is a great saint and a great thinker

1

C. S. Lewis, The Four Loves (London, 1960), 135.
Gilbert Meilaender, The Taste for the Other: The Social and Ethical Thought of C. S. Lewis, 2nd
ed. (Vancouver, 2003), 6.
2
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to whom my old glad debts are incalculable.”3 This is why the only time he
explicitly disagrees with Augustine on an important point concerning love,
he does so “with trembling.”4 Lewis’ sentiments in having to disagree with
Augustine may be comparable to Stanley Hauerwas disagreeing with Lewis.
It is difficult, Hauerwas wrote, “to criticize a writer who has done so much
good as C. S. Lewis.”5 The purpose of the present article is to evaluate the
gentlemanly engagement between Lewis and Augustine.
Lewis married late in life and had no children of his own; Augustine did
not marry, but fathered a son while still a young man. In one way or another,
both men thought much about marriage and fatherhood, love between the
sexes, and love between the generations. They also thought much about love
between friends, the love of friendship, the virtue of philia or amicita. Lewis’
poem “Scazons” (1933), for example, opens with a contemplative stanza on
the painful memory of lost friends:
Walking to-day by a cottage I shed tears
When I remembered how once I had walked there
With my friends who are mortal and dead. Years
Little had healed the wound that was laid bare.6
The remaining four stanzas will later be examined as a part of this work,
for (as will become apparent) the poem allows for an implicit—and dramatic—dialogue with Augustine. In effect, the stanzas will serve as a literary backdrop for the more systematic analysis of the engagement. Michael
Ward has offered an insightful, albeit succinct, commentary on this poem in

3

Lewis, The Four Loves, 137.
Lewis, The Four Loves, 137.
5
Stanley Hauerwas, “On Violence,” in Robert MacSwain and Michael Ward, eds., The Cambridge
Companion to C. S. Lewis (Cambridge, 2010), 189. Hauerwas, as a pacifist, appreciatively critiques
Lewis’ view on violence. Peter van Inwagen begins his critical evaluation of Lewis’ argument against naturalism in a similar vein by quoting Aristotle: “[W]e philosophers are lovers of wisdom, and while both
truth and our friends are dear to us, piety demands that we honour truth above our friends.” See Peter
van Inwagen, “C. S. Lewis’ Argument Against Naturalism,” in The Chronicle of the Oxford University
C. S. Lewis Society, vol. 7, no. 1, 2010, 2.
6
C. S. Lewis, “Scazons,” in Poems, ed. by Walter Hooper (New York, 1998), 118. “Scazons” was
first published on the penultimate page of C. S. Lewis, The Pilgrim’s Regress (London, 1998), 251. In the
Preface to Poems, Hooper writes that Lewis was “continually revising” (vii) his poems. In the Appendix,
he confirms that “Scazons” was one of the poems that had “been revised by the author” (142), since it
was first published in The Pilgrim’s Regress. Whether or not Lewis successfully and consistently improved
his poems with revisions, the editor’s job is to publish the version Lewis intended to be published “in a
volume to be called Young King Cole and Other Pieces” (vii). The last-revised edition of “Scazons” is
included herein. As for the name “Scazons,” it is the title given by the editor, as the poem originally appeared in The Pilgrim’s Regress untitled. The poem is a metrical experiment in so-called choliambic verse
(sometimes called scazon) with irregular lines and varying spondaic and trochaic feet.
4
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his work, Planet Narnia. In this essay the analysis is taken further, but the
sixteen lines Ward devotes to the poem are golden.7 In The Problem of Pain
(1940), one of Lewis’ earliest works of Christian apologetics, there is also
an attempt to make sense of suffering, including the death of loved ones in a
world supposedly created by a good and all-powerful God.8 Much later, in his
autobiographical work, A Grief Observed (1961), Lewis traces the cataract of
emotions he felt when he lost his wife to cancer. As he writes:
Nothing less will shake a man—or at any rate a man like
me—out of his merely verbal thinking and his merely notional beliefs. He has to be knocked silly before he comes to
his senses. Only torture will bring out the truth. Only under
torture does he discover himself.9
Written as a therapeutic form of diary in the aftermath of his wife’s death,
the book records how a stalwart believer, overcome by grief, almost loses all
sense of meaning in the universe, and how he gradually regains his bearings.
Nicholas Wolterstorff has insightfully described the difference between The
Problem of Pain and A Grief Observed respectively as the difference between
“an account of suffering” and “an expression of suffering.”10 In Lewis’ work,
The Four Loves (1960), which popularizes the theology of love, an entire
chapter (or one fifth of the entire book), is devoted to philia, the love of
friendship. Lewis exalts this love: friendship “has no survival value; rather it
is one of those things which give value to survival.”11 The Jesuit philosopher
Martin D’Arcy described The Four Loves as “a minor classic” that “combines
a novelist’s insight into motives with a profound religious understanding” of
our human nature.12 It is in this work that Lewis, “with trembling,” expressed
concern about Augustine’s reaction to the death of his friend.
Augustine, we see, also experienced tragic loss. In the Confessions, he
7
Michael Ward, Planet Narnia: The Seven Heavens in the Imagination of C. S. Lewis (Oxford,
2008), 106.
8
C. S. Lewis, The Problem of Pain (London, 1998), see especially 1–12.
9
C. S. Lewis, A Grief Observed (New York, 1996), 38.
10
The Problem of Pain is “a sustained Christian account of suffering. For those who want to know
how Lewis thought suffering fits into a Christian understanding of reality, this is the basic text . . . A Grief
Observed is of a different genre; it is not an account of suffering but an expression of suffering—a cry of
grief over the death of his wife, Joy, from cancer.” See Nicholas Wolterstorff, “C. S. Lewis on the Problem of Suffering,” in The Chronicle of the Oxford University C. S. Lewis Society, vol. 7, no. 3, 2010, 5.
11
Lewis, The Four Loves, 84.
12
Martin D’Arcy, New York Times Book Review, 31 July 1960. Cited in Walter Hooper, C. S.
Lewis: A Complete Guide to His Life and Works (San Francisco, 1996), 377, originally published under
the title C. S. Lewis: Companion and Guide. See also George Sayer, Jack: A Life of C. S. Lewis (Wheaton,
1994), 388.
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related several stories that involve tears. Even the death of a fictional character moved him to tears: as a young man, he had wept over the death of Dido
who, in Vergil’s Aeneid, killed herself when Aeneas did not return her love.
In Book One of the Confessions Augustine expressed shame for having shed
tears on such an occasion:
What is more pitiable than a wretch without pity for himself
who weeps over the death of Dido dying for love of Aeneas,
but not weeping over himself dying for his lack of love for
you, my God . . . I had no love for you and ‘committed
fornication against you’ (Psalm 72:27).13
Later, in Book Four, Augustine is devastated by the death of an unidentified
friend. As Lewis comments, “In words which can still bring tears to the eyes,
Augustine describes the desolation in which the death of his friend Nebridius
plunged him. . . . Then he draws a moral. This is what comes, he says, of giving one’s heart to anything but God.”14 By the time of the death of Augustine’s
mother, Monica, in Book Nine of the Confessions, Augustine is laboring to
fight back his tears.
A common reading of these stories often depicts them as signs of Augustine’s excessive Platonic spirituality and supposed attraction to Stoic invulnerability. The work of Hannah Arendt exemplifies this critique.15 Lewis, too,
though touched by Augustine’s grief, found that Augustine’s interpretation
of it made him uneasy. The passage describing the desolation he felt over his
friend’s death is, Lewis suspected, “less a part of St. Augustine’s Christendom
than a hangover from the high-minded Pagan philosophies in which he grew
up. It is closer to Stoic ‘apathy’ or neo-Platonic mysticism than to charity
[agape].”16 Lewis rejected the moral that Augustine drew: as if “this is what
comes of giving your heart to anything but God.”
The following stanzas of “Scazons” provide dramatic background for
understanding Lewis’ objection. They record two disillusionments, which is
another way of saying that the poet was under the spell of two illusions. The
first illusion (and subsequent disillusion) is biographical in nature, the second
theological. The first disillusionment is recorded in the second stanza where
the poet speaks of the “little spear that stabs”:
13

Augustine, Confessions, trans. by Henry Chadwick (Oxford, 1991), 15–16 (1.21).
Lewis, The Four Loves, 137. Lewis mistakenly—and interestingly—referred to Augustine’s unnamed friend as “Nebridius,” a point taken up later in this article.
15
See, for instance, Hannah Arendt, Love and Saint Augustine (Chicago, 1996). For a defence of
Augustine against Arendt’s critique, see Eric Gregory, Politics and the Order of Love (Chicago, 2008),
especially 202–42.
16
Lewis, The Four Loves, 138.
14
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Out little spear that stabs! I, fool, believed
I had outgrown the local, unique sting,
I had transmuted wholly (I was deceived)
Into Love universal the lov’d thing.17
The pain accompanied by the memory of the lost friend—the lost individual,
local friend—betrays the fact that the poet’s love had been imperfect. The love
he felt for particular people had not yet developed into universal love, as he
thought it should have. The pain shatters the illusion that the transmutation
of local love into universal love had been accomplished.
This disillusionment is immediately followed by a second, more profound
disillusionment, recorded in the third stanza:
But Thou, Lord, surely knewest thine own plan
When the angelic indifferencies [sic.] with no bar
Universally loved, but Thou gav’st man
The tether and pang of the particular . . .18
If the first illusion consisted of thinking that the transmutation from local to
universal love was already complete, the second illusion consists of thinking
that this transmutation was the ideal in the first place. That transmutation
is what we should strive for; that perfected love must leave behind (“transmute”) our local loves and be replaced by a supposedly more authentic love
(“Love universal”).
The tears—the stab—have given the poet a new understanding of love.
Humans are not angels, who (according to the poet) have no favorites (“angelic indifferences”), so to speak. Angels love universally with “no bar.” “But
Thou gav’st man the tether and pang of the particular.” What is this “pang of
the particular”? It can either be understood as a single instance of particular
loss, tears, a stab, or as the general human ability and disposition to sense particular loss, tears, stabs, and the deeper understanding and perhaps embracing
of this ability. (“Embracing” because, after all, the poet calls it a gift—“Thou
gav’st”.) In The Problem of Pain Lewis has written of the “intolerable compliment” paid by God, which means God loves us too much, not too little.19 In
a well-known passage, he explains his meaning:
We want, in fact, not so much a Father in Heaven as a
17

Lewis, Poems, 118.
Lewis, Poems, 118. As originally written by Lewis, the fourth word in the second line of the
stanza should be “indifferences.” The misspelling of the word is found in the work cited herein. In The
Pilgrim’s Regress, the line reads “indifferences.” See Lewis, The Pilgrim’s Progress, 251.
19
Lewis, The Problem of Pain, 27–8, 38.
18
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grandfather in heaven—a senile benevolence who, as they
say, ‘liked to see young people enjoying themselves’ and
whose plan for the universe was simply that it might be truly said at the end of the day, ‘a good time was had by all.’20
In anticipation of the final line of the poem, readers may find the gift
intolerable because “we pay for it dearly.” But, as the poet explains, “Thou,
Lord, surely knewest thine own plan.” Particularistic love is part of God’s
plan, his good plan, for humanity. It is not a sign of imperfect love.21 Is not,
however, true Christian love universal? Is not universal love still the ultimate
goal? Surely it is. But universal and particular loves are not contradictory, not
mutually exclusive. Here it is important to understand the distinction between
transmutation and transposition in Lewis’ thought. Transmutation indicates
the changing of one substance into another; or, to emphasize the point, the
annihilation of one substance into another. Transposition, on the other hand,
indicates perfecting without annihilation: the raising of a lower medium to
a new significance by incorporation into a higher medium.22 This is how the
German philosopher Josef Pieper (who described Lewis as “the great lay theologian of the present day”)23 expressed it in his aretological study of love. Perfecting, he writes, means abandonment “precisely for the sake of preserving
identity in change.”24
Human loves also follow this logic. As Lewis explained: “Divine Love
does not substitute itself for the natural—as if we had to throw away our
silver to make room for the gold. The natural loves are summoned to become
modes of Charity while also remaining the natural loves they were.”25 God
transposes our various human loves into Divine love without annihilating
them in the process. (Lewis is talking about “good” local loves; of course
there are such things as unlawful loves that may require total abandonment.)
“We do not disparage silver by distinguishing it from gold,” as one of Lewis’

20

Lewis, The Problem of Pain, 26.
What is more, in The Last Battle we are told that it is right for Lucy to weep for the death of
Narnia. The author would like to thank Louis Markos for pointing this out.
22
See C. S. Lewis, “Transposition,” in C. S. Lewis: Essay Collection and Other Short Pieces, ed.
by Lesley Walmsley (London, 2000), 267–78. See also Ward, Planet Narnia, 105. For a more systematic
analysis, see P. H. Brazier, “C. S. Lewis: A Doctrine of Transposition,” in The Heythrop Journal, vol. 50,
July 2009, 669–88. Line seven of “Scazons” underwent an interesting change from the original to the
collected edition. The revised version has: “I had transmuted wholly (I was deceived).” The 1933 version
had: “I had transmuted away (I was deceived).” The choice of away (instead of wholly) accentuates the
“illusion” of presuming that grace abolishes nature instead of perfecting it.
23
Josef Pieper, Faith, Hope, Love (San Francisco, 1997), 218.
24
Pieper, Faith, Hope, Love, 280.
25
Lewis, The Four Loves, 151–2.
21
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favorite metallurgic similes has it.26 Another of his favorite maxims was, “The
highest does not stand without the lowest.”27 Local loves need not be destroyed as universal love takes hold. In fact, universal love “does not stand”
without particular love. It might be called particularity in universality. Lewis
targets Augustine when he writes, “We follow One who wept over Jerusalem
and at the grave of Lazarus, and, loving all, yet had one disciple whom, in a
special sense, he ‘loved’.”28
In the fourth stanza, the poet calls the wounding gift of particular love “a
chemic drop.” The pang of the particular:
Which, like a chemic drop, infinitesimal,
Plashed into pure water, changing the whole,
Embodies and embitters and turns all
Spirit’s sweet water into astringent soul . . . 29
A mere drop, but enough to constitute a dramatic difference between angelic
and human nature, spirit and soul. What could potentially be discarnate spirituality is transformed into another kind of being, an embodied human soul.
“Spirit’s sweet water” is turned into “astringent soul.”
Again, there are different ways to interpret this stanza. One is to take it as
a poetic dramatization of God’s original creative act. Alternatively, it can be
understood as describing the process of our realization of what it means to be
a human person, our deepened understanding of love. In this case, the process
is set in motion by the stab, the pang of the particular, and a closer meditation
on the message it conveys. The general definition of astringent is “harsh” or,
with liquids, “bitter.” Soul, one might say, is the bitter (or bittersweet) intensification of spirit. Insofar as it is bitter, it is intolerable; and insofar as it is
sweet, it is a compliment. Emotions, even passions, are a rightful expression
of our nature.
This brings the argument back to the earlier dispute with Augustine. As
previously noted, Lewis’ reference to Augustine’s high-minded “hangover”
and “neo-Platonic mysticism” is especially relevant here. In The Allegory of
Love, Lewis referred to the “diffused Platonism, or Neoplatonism—if there is

26

Lewis, The Four Loves, 77.
Lewis, The Four Loves, 12. This is a line from Thomas à Kempis’ The Imitation of Christ (2.10)
and Lewis quotes it throughout The Four Loves.
28
Lewis, The Four Loves, 138. See, however, Augustine in Confessions (3.19): “You [God] are
all-powerful, caring for each one of us as though the only one in your care, and yet for all as for each
individual.” This exemplifies Augustine’s ambivalence. The matter is not clear-cut, as will become apparent when considering revisionist readings of Augustine later in this article.
29
Lewis, Poems, 118.
27
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a difference—of Augustine . . .”30 Augustine has often been called the father of
the “order of loves” (ordo caritatis) tradition, in which the objects of reality
are to be loved in hierarchical sequence, based on their goodness.31 Without
tracing its pedigree in detail, it can be noted that this tradition heavily “Christianizes” the conception of love found in the Symposium. Lewis explained
that, in the Symposium, we find the idea of “a ladder whereby the soul may
ascend from human love to divine,” human love being material and particular
and divine love being spiritual and universal.32 “But,” as he adds, “this is a
ladder in the strictest sense; you reach the higher rings by leaving the lower
ones behind.”33 Lewis distanced himself from such a worldview, however. “I
am inclined,” he wrote, “to distrust that species of respect for the spiritual order which bases itself on contempt for the natural.”34 It thus seems reasonable
to assume that Lewis believed that (at least in this respect and at this stage of
Augustine’s life) Augustine’s Platonic Christianity had not shaken off some
of its non-Christian dust. While Lewis would concur with Augustine that the
real problem of love is inordinate love, he rejected Augustine’s solution to
inordinate love (as expressed in the Confessions).
On one level, the moral Lewis believed that Augustine drew—“All human beings pass away [so] do not let your happiness depend on something
you may lose”—made excellent sense. Do not put your goods in a leaky vessel. Conservative by nature, this advice appealed to Lewis’ temperament, but
not his conscience. “When I respond to that appeal,” he wrote, “I seem to
myself to be a thousand miles away from Christ. If I am sure of anything I
am sure that His teaching was never meant to confirm my congenital preference for safe investments and limited liabilities.”35 Lewis was not impressed
by what might be called “Pascalian calculation”: “[W]ho could conceivably
begin to love God on such a prudential ground—because the security (so to
speak) is better? . . . Would you choose a wife or a Friend—it if comes to that,
would you choose a dog—in this spirit?” Lewis made his point clear: “One
must be outside the world of love, of all loves, before one thus calculates.
30

C. S. Lewis, The Allegory of Love (Oxford, 1986), 46.
According to Risto Saarinen, Lewis is not an advocate of what Anders Nygren called “the Augustinian caritas-synthesis,” because Lewis “seems to lack an ordo caritatis” and “the natural affinities between the loves are weaker than in Thomas.” See Risto Saarinen, “Eros, Playfulness and Norms:
Towards a Fundamental Theology of Love,” in The Finnish Theological Journal, vol. 2, 2006, 6. For a
short overview of main themes in Augustine’s theology of love, see Bernard McGinn, The Foundations of
Mysticism: Origins to the Fifth Century (New York, 1991), 234–6.
32
Lewis, The Allegory of Love, 5.
33
Lewis, The Allegory of Love, 5. See also the references to “the Platonic ascent” in C. S. Lewis,
English Literature in the Sixteenth Century Excluding Drama (Oxford, 1954), 159, 386, 532.
34
Lewis, The Allegory of Love, 267.
35
Lewis, The Allegory of Love, 137.
31
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Eros, lawless Eros, preferring the Beloved to happiness, is more like Love
Himself than this.”36
Our loves, it is true, are inordinate—out of order. The need for a correct
order of loves stands out in Lewis’ thought. By it he does not mean simply
a need to “control your loves,” but, supposedly, quite literally, keep them in
order. However, the quality that constitutes the inordinacy is not excessive
love, but rather defective love. “We may love [our friend] too much in proportion to our love for God; but it is the smallness of our love for God, not the
greatness of our love for man, that constitutes the inordinacy.”37 Our flaw is
not excess love for our children over our spouse, but defective love for our
spouse; not excess love for our friend over God, but defective love for God.
We do not love our spouse more by loving our children less, nor do we love
God more by loving our friend less.38 According to Lewis, inordinate “does
not mean ‘insufficiently cautious’. Nor does it mean ‘too big’.”39 It is not a
quantitative term at all. In fact, Lewis doubts whether it is even possible to
love a human being “too much.” In this sense, the dynamics of virtue know
no positive limit. The question whether we are loving our earthly beloved or
God more is not, “so far as concerns our Christian duty, a question about the
comparative intensity of two feelings. The real question is, which (when the
alternative comes) do you serve, or choose, or put first? To which claim does
your will, in the last resort, yield?”40
Accompanying this new understanding of human love is a new reality, or
the acceptance of the reality that has always been present. As for “Scazons,”
it comes to a close with this fifth stanza:
That we, though small, might quiver with Fire’s same
Substantial form as Thou—not reflect merely
Like lunar angels back to Thee cold flame.
Gods are we, Thou hast said; and we pay dearly.41
36
Lewis, The Four Loves, 137–8. On Lewis’ disagreement with Anders Nygren on the question of
love’s relation to happiness, see Jason Lepojärvi, “Does Eros Seek Happiness? A Critical Analysis of C.
S. Lewis’s Reply to Anders Nygren,” in Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie, vol. 53, 2011, 208– 24.
37
Lewis, The Four Loves, 139–40.
38
In The Great Divorce, Lewis has his mentor, George MacDonald, explain that the real tragedy
of the tearful ghost of the mother raging over the loss of her son, Michael, is that “[s]he loved her son too
little, not too much.” See C. S. Lewis, The Great Divorce (London, 2002), 87–8.
39
Lewis, The Four Loves, 139.
40
Lewis, The Four Loves, 140. In the last resort, as Lewis wrote, “we must turn down or disqualify
our nearest and dearest when they come between us and our obedience to God. Heaven knows, it will
seem to them sufficiently like hatred... This is why it is of such extreme importance so to order our loves
that it [an occasion for such ‘hatred’] is unlikely to arrive at all” (141, 142, emphasis added).
41
Lewis, Poems, 118.
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Since man is created in the image of God, embracing our full nature implies
embracing our divine calling as well. “Gods we are, Thou hast said.” The distinction between Creator and creature is not eclipsed. The tone of the poem
has been humbling, referring to God as the creator and source of life. But we,
“though small,” nonetheless participate in God’s love. Human love shares,
essentially, God’s love. Lewis situated himself (probably consciously), in direct opposition to his contemporary, Anders Nygren, the Swedish Lutheran
theologian and bishop, who taught that human beings are mere “conduits”
or “channels” of divine love.42
The poet compares angelic existence to the moon (“lunar angels”). The
moon gives light, but that is borrowed light, reflected from the sun, and by the
time it reaches our faces it has lost all warmth. Of course, human existence is
also derivative. This applies to human love as well. The poet is not satisfied
with this, however, or so it seems. Humans are called to “quiver” with fire
itself, that is, vibrate inwardly, and not merely to reflect “cold flame.” Human
nature is blessed—if men and women can take it—with “native luminosity.”
This luminosity is a gift, and yet, somehow, it is truly “ours.”43
If men and women can take it. For this gift includes a compliment that
(as noted above) may prove intolerable for some. To love is to be vulnerable.
There is, however, as Lewis insisted, “no escape along the lines St. Augustine
suggests.”44 In fact, there is no escape along any lines whatsoever. Love is followed by hurt; and hurt, it may be said, is a subtle double invitation: either
to love again, or not. Hurt may be likened to smoke from a dying fire. The
smoke is intolerably suffocating. One must either clear the air and rekindle
the flame, or extinguish it for good. As Lewis wrote:
If you want to make sure of keeping it intact, you must give
your heart to no one, not even an animal. Wrap it carefully
42
Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros (New York, 1969). The Christian, according to Nygren, “can
be likened to a tube . . . He is merely the tube, the channel, through which God’s love flows” (735).
Nygren’s conception of love is almost predestinarian, as “all choice on man’s part is excluded. Man loves
good . . . because God’s unmotivated love has overwhelmed him and taken control of him, so that he
cannot do other than love God” (213–14). For an outline of Lewis’ position in “the Nygren debate,” see
Jason Lepojärvi, “C. S. Lewis and ‘the Nygren Debate’,” in The Chronicle of the Oxford University C.
S. Lewis Society, vol. 7, 2, 2010, 25–42. See also Meilaender, The Taste for the Other, 56–7, 122–3; and
Caroline Simon, “On Love,” in MacSwain and Ward, The Cambridge Companion to C. S. Lewis, 154–5.
43
In The Four Loves, Lewis wrote of man’s “native luminosity,” but rejected it. In that context,
however, it carries a specific meaning: “the pretence that we have anything of our own or could for one
hour retain by our own strength any goodness that God may pour into us . . .” And yet, “The consequences of parting with our last claim to intrinsic freedom, power, or worth, are real freedom, power and
worth, really ours just because God gives them and because we know them to be (in another sense) not
‘ours’.” See Lewis, The Four Loves, 149.
44
Lewis, The Four Loves, 138.
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round with hobbies and little luxuries; avoid all entanglements; lock it up safe in the casket or coffin of your selfishness. But in that casket—safe, dark, motionless, airless—it
will change. It will not be broken; it will become unbreakable, impenetrable, irredeemable. The alternative to tragedy, or at least to the risk of tragedy, is damnation. The only
place outside Heaven where you can be perfectly safe from
the dangers and perturbations of love is Hell.45
This is one of the most memorable lines in The Four Loves. But what
about Lewis’ own memory? After all, he mistakenly referred to Augustine’s
unnamed friend as “Nebridius.”46 What can explain this error? We know that
in his popular writing, Lewis may sometimes have “taken little pains to trace
ideas or quotations to their sources when they were not easily recoverable.”47
But that cannot be the case here, for Augustine’s Confessions was certainly
easily recoverable.48 Lewis’ mistake is undoubtedly a human error, due to
Augustine’s mention of his “dearest friend Nebridius” in Book Four just two
pages before the account of the unnamed friend.49 Nebridius, too, suffered a
premature death, but it was recorded much later, in Book Nine.50
Eric Gregory, who is sympathetic towards Lewis, is at least as sympathetic towards Augustine. He defends the story of Dido against critics such as
Arendt and, in the case of the unnamed friend, implicitly against Lewis. But
could Lewis have misunderstood Augustine?
As for Dido, Vergil’s heroine, Gregory points out that the backdrop for
the story is a contrast that Augustine drew throughout Book One between
reality and illusion, or between the need to attend to reality and his own “love
of games [and] passion for frivolous spectacles, and . . . restless urge to imitate
comic scenes.”51 According to this reading, Augustine regretted weeping, not
because he regretted loving, but because his love had been unreal, a form of
escapism. Gregory provides a modern analogy (with his apologies to Vergil):
45

Lewis, The Four Loves, 138–9.
As Lewis wrote: “In words that can still bring tears to the eyes, Augustine describes the desolation in which the death of his friend Nebridius plunged him.” Lewis, The Four Loves, 137. This point
was identified by Eric Gregory in Politics and the Order of Love, 280. Gregory is a former president of
the Oxford University C. S. Lewis Society.
47
Lewis, The Problem of Pain, x.
48
The collection of books owned by C. S. Lewis found in the University of North Carolina at
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“[C]rying over reality TV or the infotainment packaging of death for media
consumption just before we go off to ‘bowl alone’ in Robert Putnam’s America. They allow you to enjoy weeping without demanding compassion.”52 As
Augustine asked in Book Three, “But what quality of mercy is it in fictitious
and theatrical inventions? A member of the audience is not excited to offer
help, but invited only to grieve.”53
As to the unnamed friend, Gregory offers in essence the same alternative
reading. Augustine’s grief is not that he loved too much, but that he did not
really love his friend at all.54 Whereas Jesus wept for Lazarus, Augustine wept
for weeping’s sake. As he confesses: “I was so wretched that I felt a greater
attachment to my life of misery than to my dead friend. Although I wanted
it to be otherwise, I was more unwilling to lose my misery than him.” This
led Augustine to want to escape: “I found myself heavily weighed down by
a sense of being tired of living and scared of dying.”55 Gerald Schlabach,
another Augustinian scholar, thinks that at this stage of his life, Augustine
valued the ideal of friendship more than the friend itself.56
Eric Gregory agrees, but takes his vindication of Augustine even further.
He argues that Augustine used the story as an allegorical opportunity to confess and mourn his forgetfulness of God:
So I boiled with anger, sighed, wept, and was at my wits’
end. I found no calmness, no capacity for deliberation. I carried my lacerated and bloody soul when it was unwilling to
be carried by me. I found no place where I could put it
down. There was no rest in pleasant groves, nor in games or
songs, nor in sweet-scented places, nor in exquisite feasts,
nor in the pleasures of the bedroom and bed, nor, finally, in
books and poetry. Everything was an object of horror, even
light itself; all that was not he made me feel sick and was
repulsive—except for groaning and tears. In them alone was
there some relief.57
All that was not he: who is this “he”? If it was not written with a minuscule,
lower case “h,” readers might be misled to think Augustine is speaking of
52
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God. This is perhaps not surprising, for immediately following is Augustine’s
confession of having had a false image of God:
But when my weeping stopped, my soul felt burdened by a
vast load of misery. I should have lifted myself to you, Lord,
to find a cure. I knew that but did not wish it or have the
strength for it. When I thought of you, my mental image
was not of anything solid and firm; it was not you but a vain
phantom. My error was my god.58
Not only had Augustine’s love for his friend been illusory, he could find no
solace in his illusory image of God. He concluded the chapter of his pilgrimage story with these words: “And [so] I fled from my home town, for my eyes
sought for him less in a place where they were not accustomed to see him.
And so from the town of Thagaste I came to Carthage.”59
Overall, the revisionist defense of Augustine is attractive, but is it plausible? And if it is plausible, does it pull the rug out from under Lewis’ critique? Does he miss his mark? To consider this from the perspective of Lewis’
scholarly acumen, it would be most accurate to conclude that, if Lewis misunderstood Augustine, it was simply a misunderstanding and not a fundamental disagreement. The burden of having to disagree with this “great saint
and great thinker” would thus be lifted from Lewis’ shoulders. This does not
mean, of course, that a celestial apology will not be offered—or perhaps even
an exchange of apologies. For, despite the wisdom given to him, in Augustine
(as in Paul) “there are some things that are hard to understand.”60
There are, however, reasons to suppose that Lewis did not misunderstand
Augustine. Theological reconstruction of the “Augustinian tradition” is one
thing; historical patristic analysis, another. And historical scholarship generally sides with Lewis’ interpretation of the Confessions. In his Amor Dei, John
Burnaby has concluded that Augustine’s earlier works do “betray something
very like hostility” to instinctive affection, suggesting even that “the ties of
kinship are no more than consequences of the Fall,”61 albeit that in later life
(in Retractions) Augustine “peremptorily condemns such a view.”62 Simo Knuuttila, too, notes that “negative characterizations are common in Augustine’s
remarks on the emotions,” even if in the City of God, which includes a more
extensive discussion of emotions than does the Confessions, Augustine admits
58
59
60
61
62

Augustine, Confessions, 59–60 (4.12).
Augustine, Confessions, 60 (4.12).
2 Peter 3:16.
John Burnaby, Amor Dei. A Study of the Religion of St. Augustine (Eugene, 2007), 128, 129.
Burnaby, Amor Dei, 129.

80

Jason Lepojärvi

to the valuable functions of emotions and rejects Stoic suspicion of them.63
We need not, however, definitely settle the matter here. What seems evident is that Augustine provides a wealth of material, some of it ambivalent,
for both the revisionist reading and critics such as Arendt and Lewis. A telling
case in point is the death of Augustine’s mother. Recall that Augustine labored
hard to fight back his tears; eventually, he succumbed to the grief welling up
inside him. “Now I let flow the tears which I had held back so that they ran as
freely as they wished,” he wrote, and then offered his confession:
My heart rested upon them [the tears], and it reclined upon
them because it was your ears that were there, not those of
some human critic who would put a proud interpretation
on my weeping. And now, Lord, I make my confession to
you in writing. Let anyone who wishes read and interpret as
he pleases. If he finds fault that I wept for my mother for a
fraction of an hour, the mother who had died before my
eyes who had wept for me that I might live before your eyes,
let him not mock me but rather, if a person of much charity,
let him weep himself before you for my sins.64
One can almost feel the tension in Augustine between what, on the one hand,
he had learned from Plotinus about the ignobility of weeping, and, on the
other, the human frailties that, as a Christian, he came to understand “are a
necessary part of the order we have to endure and are the lot of the human
condition.”65ÊU
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